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I, Statement of Jurisdictipn
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (1995) , Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and State v. Troyer. 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995).

The

trial court signed the final written order of dismissal on July
22, 1997. R.31.
II. Statement of the Issue(s) Presented for Review & Standard of
Appellate Review
Issue (s)

for

Review.

(A) Did

the

trial

court

fail

to

evaluate the significance of uncontroverted facts, or facts as
the court found them?
law

based

on

such

(B) Are the trial court's conclusions of
facts

correct?

Was

the

trial

conclusion induced by an erroneous view of the law?

court's

Does State

v. White, 856 P. 2d 656 (Utah 1993) authorize the trial court to
grant

a motion to suppress under the facts presented by this

present case?
Standard of Review.

(A) Factual findings underlying trial

courts' decisions to grant motions to suppress are reviewed under
the "clearly erroneous standard". State v. Troyer, 910 P. 2d 1182
(Utah 1995) .

A reviewing court "will find clear error only if

[it decides] that the factual findings made by the trial court

1

are not

adequately

considered

u

in

determination."

a

supported

light

Id.

most

by

the

record."

favorable

to

Id.

the

Facts

trial

(B) An appellate court then

are

court's

"reviews the

trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under a
correctness standard,

[citation omitted] , according no deference

to its legal conclusions." Id.
III. Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes,
Ordinances, and Rules
A. Constitutional Provisions
1. Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
2. Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon
probable
cause
supported
by
oath
or
affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
B. Statutes
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-16 (1953 as amended):
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger.

2

2. Utah Code Ann. S 77-18a-l(2) (1995) \"Appeals-When proper."!:
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
final order of dismissal . . . .
3. Utah Code Ann.
jurig^igtiQnrl .

§

78-2a-3 (2) (e)

(1996)

[Court

of

(a) a

Appeals

(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, over:
•

*

•

*

(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases

....

C. Ordinances - Salt Lake City Corporation
1.

11.2 0.040. Unlawful acts involving drug paraphernalia.
A. It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate,
grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal,
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter.
B. It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be
used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in
violation of this chapter.
C. It is unlawful for any person eighteen years of age or
over to deliver drug paraphernalia to a minor.
D. It is unlawful for any person to place in this city, in
any newspaper, magazine, handbill or other publication, any
advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. (Prior code § 32-8A-4)
2.

11.24.020. Controlled substances - Possession prohibited ExceptJQngt
A. No person shall knowingly or intentionally possess or use
a controlled substance, as defined in the Controlled Substances
Act of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, or its successor, unless it
is obtained pursuant to a valid prescription or order, or

3

directly from a practitioner authorized to prescribe such
substances, while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act.
B. Violation of this section shall be punished with a
punishment provided for a Class B misdemeanor. (Prior code § 328-5)
1^

;U,48,Q7Q. Congealed weapons? T
A. It is unlawful for any person, except a peace officer, to
carry any slingshot, brass knuckles, firearms, daggers, stiletto,
nunchaku stick, or any other instrument or object capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury concealed upon his person.
B. It is unlawful for any person, except a peace officer, to
carry concealed on his person any dangerous weapon with the
intent or the purpose to use the same to harm, maim or injure
another person, animal or thing. For the purpose of this
subsection:
1. "Dangerous weapon" means any item that, in the manner of
its use or intended use, is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury; and
2. In construing whether or not an object or thing not
commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the
character of the wound produced, if any, and the manner in which
the instrument, object or thing was used or intended to be used,
are factors which the court shall take into account in deciding
the question. (Prior code § 32-6-3)
P. Rules.
1. Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final order of dismissal . . . .

IV, Statement of the Case
The Defendant, Arnold L. Medina ("Defendant"), is alleged to
have

committed

violations

of

Salt

4

Lake

City

Code

Sections

11.24.020 (Possession of a Controlled Substance), 11.20.040 (Drug
Paraphernalia), and 11.48.070 (Carrying a Concealed Weapon). R.5.
The Defendant entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment to the
charges on/about January 16, 1997.
held on March 19, 1997.
On or about April

A pretrial conference was

See Record ("R."), Index of Proceedings.

16, 1997, the Defendant,

through counsel,

filed his "Motion to Suppress Based on No Reasonable Suspicion to
Frisk", citing the Fourth Amendment

to the U.S. Constitution,

Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Terry v. Ohio. 392
U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968);
808 P.2d 133

State v. Grovier,

(Utah App. 1591); State v. Swanigan. 699 P.2d 718

(Utah 1985); and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993).
R.4.

On or about April 17, 1997, an evidentiary hearing was held

on the Defendant's motion to suppress.
defendant's

motion

Proceedings.
Hilder

issued

under

advisement.

On or about April
his

The trial court took the

Findings

of

Record,

Index

of

22, the Honorable

Robert

K.

Fact

See

and

Conclusions

of

Law

("FFCL"). R.27-30.
The trial court, relying primarily on State v. White, found
that

"although

the

justified." R.29.

stop

was

justified,

the

frisk

was

not

The trial court ordered all search evidence

suppressed. R.29. A trial date was set.
5

On July 9, 1997, the

City

indicated

that

the

court's

order

suppressing

the

frisk

evidence effectively prevented the City from going forward with
the prosecution, and requested the court's certification to that
effect pursuant to State v. Troyer. 866 P. 2d 528
The trial court ordered the case dismissed.

(Utah 1993) .

The certification

and order of dismissal were signed by Judge Hilder on July 23,
1997. R.31.

This appeal followed.

The Notice of Appeal was

filed August 6, 1997. R.33.
V, Statement of Relevant Facts,
Facts as found by the trial court are set out in bold and
quotation

marks.

The

record

evidence

dealing

with

the

same

Wooldridge

was

subject matter follows.
A.
patrolling

"On
in

December
the

22,

area of

1996,

915

South

Officer
State

Street,

Salt

Lake

City." R.27.
The officer had worked as a Salt Lake City Police Officer
for at least five (5) years at the date of this encounter. R.40.
The officer had worked in the immediate area for "about 8 months
as a patrol officer on graveyards" at some point prior to this
encounter. R.40.

The officer "was doing an overtime shift for

DUI suppression" and indicated that provided him "the opportunity
on duty to check up on a problem area within

6

[his] district."

R.44.
B.
alley

"Officer Wooldridge

is notorious

observed

two males

proceeded

for criminal
apparently

down

activity,

attempting

an

alley,

at which
to enter

which

time he

the motor

vehicle without the use of a key." R.27.
The officer identified specific criminal problems in the
area, among them "drug sales" and "numerous stabbings, shootings
and fights". R.43-44.
not well

The officer indicated that the alley is

lighted, describing

officer was

in uniform,

it as

"very dark". R.45.

in an unmarked police

The

car, running

without headlights or brakelights ("blacked out"). R.45-46.

The

officer observed two persons near a parked car in the alley.
R.46.

The area where the vehicle was located was not generally a

parking area, and was located near the Red Belle Saloon. R.46.
"The trunk of the car was facing northbound and the trunk of the
car was pretty much just to north of the back door of the Red
Belle . . . ." R.52.
The

defendant

was

trying

to get

into

the

car

on

the

passenger side, "which would have been on the side on the alley."
R.52.

The officer observed the two persons for "mere seconds"

before approaching them. R.53.

The officer

"approached

[the

defendant] because things looked suspicious because he [looked]
7

like [he was] breaking into a car". R.61.

Initially, the officer

observed the defendant trying to get in to the parked car "with
what

appeared

to be

some type of tools". R.46.

These

tools

turned out to be "a coat hanger and a screwdriver". R.46.
C.

"Officer

Wooldridge

called

for

back-up,

but

he

No one else was seen in the alley by the officer. R.46.

The

proceeded to approach the two individuals alone." R.28.

officer

"probably"

called

for

approaching" the defendant. R.54.

backup

assistance

"prior

to

The officer did not recognize

the defendant until he approached the defendant on foot, before
he frisked the defendant. R.54.

The basis for approaching the

defendant was that "it appeared that he was breaking into a car"
and the area was one with "continued and frequent drug activity,
homicide stabbings, shootings . . . ." R.60.
Immediately upon approaching him, the defendant advised the
officer that this was the defendant's own car. R.61-62.

When he

approached the two persons, the officer gave a verbal command for
them to put their hands on the back of their heads or to keep
their hands where the officer could see them. R.63.

Both persons

complied. R.63.
The officer indicated that there are a number of things that
could be "keyed on" under the circumstances, among them:
8

someone

trying to put their hands in their pockets after being told not
to do so, and the presence of tools already in someone's hands.
R.64.

"The fact that [the defendant] already had two instruments

in his hand[s] and tools indicated to

[the officer] that

[the

defendant] might have other tools, or objects . . . that he could
have used as a weapon on his person." R.64.

The officer could

not recall where the tools were when the officer directed the
persons to raise their hands, but indicated that he did not see
the defendant "drop his tools and try to go for anything else."
R.64.

At some point prior to the frisk, the officer collected

the tools from the defendant. R.64.
D.

w

not
was

As Officer Wooldridge approached the individuals/ he
one of them was defendant, Arnold Medina,

known

Officer

Wooldridge

as

an

Mr, Medina

employee

of

an

establishment located in the immediate area where he was observed
by the officer." R.28.
The officer was "familiar with [the defendant] because [the
officer]

knew

that

Saloon." R.61-62.
and

seven

prior

[the

defendant]

worked

at

the

Red

Belle

The officer estimated he had had between four
conversations

with

the

defendant,

and

"most

times" the defendant appeared to be "very amicable and willing to
cooperate" with the officer. R.55.

9

At other times, the defendant

was "'just verbally disagreeable"', and very physically animated"
when he talked. R.55.

The defendant "had never tried to strike

[the officer] or do anything physical towards
being

physically

animated

as he

[him]" other than

spoke. R.55

(quoting

defense

counsel).
The

officer

indicated

he believed

the

defendant

"potential for violence based on his history." R.56.

had

the

The officer

was not "personally aware" of the defendant "having a reputation
for carrying a gun". R.56.
has ever told me that
R.57.

The officer testified that "No one

[the defendant] had carried a weapon."

The officer testified that "[the officer] did suspect in

the past that [the defendant] may have [carried a weapon]." R.57.
As a basis for that suspicion, the officer indicated that the
defendant's
reported
gang's

demeanor

affiliation
"potential

methamphetamine

in

the

with
for

a

Red

Belle

motorcycle

violence"

and

Saloon,
gang,

the

that

Saloon's

motorcycle

"affiliation"

lab, and the officer's encounters with

with

a

"people

who had been in and out of the Red Belle who had been carrying
meth on them." R.57.

As to the defendant, the officer had "no

other valid information, other than the fact that [the defendant]
work[ed] there, that
activity that

[he was] involved in any of

[the] illegal

[the officer] referred to . . . ." R.58

10

(quoting

defense counsel's questioning).

The officer's suspicion about

the defendant was based on the location at which he worked and
the officer's previous 4-7 ''primarily amiable" contacts with the
defendant. R.59

(quoting defense counsel's questioning).

Any

prior disagreements between the officer and the defendant were
only marked by the defendant's being "very animated physically
and

.

.

.

verbally

characterizations).

loud."

R.59

(defense

counsel's

During prior conversations, the officer and

the defendant had discussed the defendant's criminal history, and
had discussed the defendant's "problems with people in the bar".
R.59.

The officer did not suspect the defendant as a suspect in

x

'any homicides or shootings that had occurred just prior" to the

officer approaching the defendant in the alley. R.60-61 (quoting
defense counsel) .

The officer did not go "back into that alley

based on looking for some suspect for a homicide or a shooting".
R.61

(quoting defense counsel).

The officer's entry into the

alley "was part of proactive patrolling and trying to prevent
something

from

"investigating

happening".
some

just

R.61.

prior

The

incident

evening". R.61 (quoting defense counsel).

officer
that

was

occurred

not
that

The officer was "just

doing general surveillance of the area to make sure nothing [did]
happen". R.61 (quoting defense counsel).

11

E.

"In addition, as Officer Wooldridge approached the two

individuals/

he noted that Mr. Medina was holding both a coat

hanger and a screw driver.

Officer Wooldridge did not notice any

other tools or implements of any kind/ neither did he notice any
suspicious bulges or items in defendant's clothing." R.28.
The officer could see both of the defendant's hands, and
could identify what the tools were that he had in his hands.
R.49.

The officer then patted down the defendant for weapons.

R.49.

In the course of the search, the officer felt a knifelike

object in the defendant's right front pants pocket, and in the
left front pants pocket an object that felt like paraphernalia.
R.50.

The knife was a folding knife, roughly

three

to

four

inches long in the pocket, had two blades, with the words "jack
the

ripper"

on

it. R.50,65.

The officer

indicated

that

the

defendant reported the car was his, that he had locked his keys
in the vehicle, and was trying to get back into the car. R.50.
At the time the officer frisked the defendant, the officer did
not know that it was in fact the defendant's car. R.51.
F.
defendant,

"Officer Wooldridge had had numerous conversations with
knew

that

he

was

an

employee

of

the

adjacent

establishment/ and although he knew of a criminal record/ Officer
Wooldridge did not specifically identify any history of violence
12

during his testimony." R.28.
G.

"Although Officer Wooldridge testified that he had some

concern because

he did not

know

the other

individual

in

the

alley, the officer frisked Mr. Medina, the person that was known
to him, I i i nt ; therefore
did not objectively

Court iiindH I: licit; Officer Wooldridge

evidence any heightened

concern about

the

unknown person." R.28.
The officer described
gentleman". R.45.
location,

[and]

the other person as

The officer indicated that
the

return

criminal

officer's] previous contacts with
did a

(inaudible) frisk for

"another older
"because of the

problems

there,

[the

[the defendant], the officer

[his] safety." R.47.

The officer

also "patted down" the other individual, checked both persons for
warrants, and "sent the other gentleman on his way." R.51.
The officer had had "several other contacts that ended in
arrests
sergeant

in
had

that

alley"

called

the

a

few

alley

months

before.

"murder

alley".

The
R.53.

homicide
Before

determining whether the car was in fact the defendant's, "because
of contacts

[the police] have had with individuals in that area

[the officer] was going to check [the defendant] for weapons for
[the officer's] safety." R.62.

"[At] that point in time, [the

officer did not] do anything to try to verify that this was in
13

fact [the defendant's] car." R.62.
* [The] very next thing [the officer] did was in fact, frisk
[the defendant]."
defendant,
eyesight,

the

R.62.

While

"other

possibly

the

gentleman"

off

to

the

officer

was

was

outside

officer's

left.

frisking
the

the

officer's

This

"other

gentleman" was not moving, "keeping his hands either on his head
or in plain view." R.62.
The officer

checked

the defendant

for weapons

" [b]ecause

it's a dark alley, there's frequent physical assaults in that
area.

I'm alone, I have two people with me . . . [the defendant

and the] other gentleman that I didn't know and I didn't know his
history . . . ." R.66.

The officer stated that "I believe that

any other action than to check these people for weapons would
detriment [sic] to physical safety." R.66-67.
The officer answered affirmatively when asked whether in the
course of "investigating people just generally on the street in
[his] course of duty as a police officer [he had] found that some
people have weapons and would in fact attack

[him] as a police

officer''. R.67.
VI. Summary of the Argument,
Irrespective of the trial court's factual interpretation of
the testimony, the trial court erroneously interpreted or applied

14

State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993).

The trial court's

order that the evidence be suppressed should be reversed and the
matter remanded to the trial court for trial.
VII. ARGUMENT.
The

"frisk"

Section 77-7-16

in Utah

is governed

(1953 as amended) :

U

by Utah

Code

Annotated

A peace officer who has

stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person
for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other
person is in danger."
The trial court's interpretation or application of State v.
White, 856 P.2d 656

(Utah App. 1993), and associated state and

federal case law to the facts presented here is incorrect.
1

Whether

reasonable

suspicion

exists

in

investigative

detentions may present a question of fact." White, 856 P. 2d at
659.

"When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a

motion to suppress, [the appellate court] will uphold the trial
court's

underlying

findings

of

fact

unless

they

are

clearly

erroneous." White, 856 P.2d at 659.
The
search

final

is

determination

reviewed

for

of

lawfulness

correctness.

White,

of

a detention

856

P. 2d

at

(citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-71(Utah 1993)).

15

or
659

Here, the trial court "failed to evaluate the significance
of

uncontroverted

therefore

the

facts, or

trial

court's

facts

as

the

conclusion

court

was

xw

found

them";

induced

by

an

erroneous view of the law'". White, 856 P.2d at 659(quoting State
v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)(citations omitted)).
A. Reliability of the Information
Was Not At Issue
w

[T]he

particular

reliability
frisk

of

the

is based becomes

(Direct Officer

Observation)

information

upon

a critical

element

which

a

[of the

appellate court's] evaluation of that frisk." White. 856 P.2d at
661.

A significant

present
party

case

is not

factual distinction between White and the

is that
at

reliability

issue.

of

information

The officer's

suspicion

from a
of

third

criminal

activity here did not arise from a third-party phone call, but
from

personal

observation.

Here

an

officer

observed

an

individual attempting to enter a car with a coat hanger and a
screw driver in a dark alley.

In White, the officer personally

observed two figures in the back seat of a car engaged in some
undetermined activity.

Thus, a major concern of the White court

is not present here, specifically that "the trial court made no
finding about the reliability of the information given to the
officers." White. 856 P.2d at 662.
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The White opinion reads:
In this case, the questionable reliability of [the
informant's] allegations should have sensitized both
the officers and the trial court to the need for
considering whether the frisk could be justified
independently of the stop. Circumstantial information
which might dispel or support initial concern that a
frisk
might
be
necessary,
therefore,
becomes
particularly relevant.
White,

856 P. 2d at

662

(emphasis added) .

The

circumstantial

information available to the officer here increased concern for
safety, not dissipated it, and justified the frisk.
B. No Preliminary Inquiry Was Required Prior to Frisk,
When

is an automatic

inquiry necessary?

frisk

justified

and

no

preliminary

Stated otherwise, what is reasonable inquiry

under any given fact pattern? How much preliminary

inquiry is

enough?
The City

specifically

court's conclusions of law.

takes

issue with

two of

the

trial

First:

2. The officer appropriately identified himself as a
policeman, but before he made reasonable inquiries
he engaged in a Terry frisk of Mr. Medina." R.28.
Under the facts here, no inquiry was required prior to the
frisk.

The

record

indicates

information

when

confronted

situations,

that

would

be

that

the

that

the

enough

to
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defendant

car

was

suggest

his.
some

volunteered
In

some

additional

reasonable

preliminary

inquiry

would

be

appropriate.

For

example, two officers coming across a person in a busy parking
lot at noon trying to get in a car with just a coat hanger.
potential

weapons

are

in hand, one officer

can observe

No
the

citizen, the other officer can help the citizen gain entry to the
car and proof of ownership, call a locksmith, or call dispatch
for registration information.
The expectation of the trial court appears to be that a solo
officer in a dark alley, outnumbered two to one, is expected to
confirm that the vehicle is in fact the defendant's.
problems with this expectation.

There are

Assuming that the registration

is in the car, it is now locked in the car.

Is the officer

obligated to unlock the car and examine the registration while
two persons hover about him?

This means that the officer must

attempt the trial court's investigation and monitor two persons
who could be armed.
The officer could detain the two persons until back-up
arrives - an uncertain proposition at best.

Such a scenario

leaves the suspect (s) and the officer in a state of dynamic
tension for an unknown period of time.

If the suspects are

innocent citizens, they must wait until resource demands allow
back-up to arrive.

If the suspects are armed, and they know they
18

cannot

be

searched until backup arrives, they will

know

that

their best opportunity for escape is to overwhelm or evade the
lone officer before backup arrives.

Such a policy determination

invites attack on a solitary officer waiting for backup.
C. Reasonable Suspicion for a Frisk Did Not Dissipate Between the
Investigative Detention and the Frisk Itself.
Dissipative Factors.
frisk" to "dissipate"?
quantum

of

evidence

What causes "reasonable suspicion to

"If by investigation or happenstance the
needed

to

justify

a

forcible

stop

has

dissipated during [the interval between the stop and the frisk],
then it is not permissible to frisk." Wayne R. LeFave, 3 Search
^d

Seizure, § 9.4(a) at 502 (2nd ed. 1987) (quoted in White. 856

P.2d at 663) .
The trial court attached an improper significance

to the

officer's prior contacts with the defendant that is not supported
by the evidence:
4.
Based on the Officer's testimony, and on his fairly
significant acquaintenship [sic] with Defendant, as well as
the fact that Defendant was at a location fully justified by
his employment, which fact was known to the officer, the
Court determines that a reasonable officer's fears would
have been appropriately dispelled and that the need for a
frisk
dissipated
before
the
frisk
was
undertaken.
R.29.(emphasis added).
The general statement that a conclusion of law is based on
an officer's testimony is not helpful.
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The characterization of

the

officer-defendant

based

on

4-7

acquaintance

prior

as

"fairly

conversations,

some

of

significant"
which

is

involved

discussion of the defendant's prior criminal history. R.55.

The

trial court is mandating that a prior acquaintanceship without
confirmation of violence or a violent nature can override the
significance of the context of the immediate encounter.

This

presents the dreaded "slippery slope".
What
that

parameters

renders

a

define

frisk

a

fairly

significant

unreasonable?

How

much

acquaintance
knowledge

of

personal background "dissipates" appropriate concern for safety?
What

knowledge

dissipated

of

the

reasonable

inappropriate?

defendant's
concern

personal

and

background

rendered

the

here
frisk

The City would submit that the context of the

encounter here should be given greater weight in the balancing
test than prior acquaintance.
The one specific point referred to by the trial court is
"the fact that Defendant was at a location fully justified by his
employment". R.29.

Common knowledge confirms that crimes are

committed at businesses by employees either during their shift or
after work hours.

The nature of the business itself can provide

an employee with the opportunity for certain criminal activity.
Common sense would acknowledge that employees can commit crimes
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against other employees as they work or against customers who
might

be

fully

enjoying

the

service

provided

by

the

with

the

establi shment ?
The

officer's

recognition

of

and

acquaintance

defendant does not dissipate the reasonable suspicion for a frisk
here.

This was not a lifelong friend trying to get into the car

that the officer had seen him driving everyday for twenty years
down main street at noon. The assertion by the defendant that the
car was his property does not by itself dissipate the concern for
safety. Perhaps if the defendant could have produced title or
registration - but then, those were either unavailable or locked
in the car.

Police officers should not be and are not required

by law to conduct preliminary investigation or inquiry before the
officers have taken reasonable precautions for their safety.
The significance of the third-party informant to White's
analysis regarding the need for preliminary inquiry is apparent.
"Where

a

confrontation

develops

in

such

a

manner

that

questioning can be safely undertaken to substantiate or dispel
suspicions originally aroused by third party hearsay rather than
actual

observation,

preliminary

inquiry

appropriate." White, 856 P.2d at 663
suggests

a

frisk

based

on

actual
21

may

be

especially

(emphasis added).
observation

of

This

suspected

criminal

activity,

as here, reduces

the

need

for

preliminary

inquiry.
D. The Type of Criminal Activity
Legality of the Frisk,

Suspected

Here

Supports

the

Terry, subsequent comment and Utah case law recognize that
the type of criminal activity suspected can be determinative of
frisk

legality.

White

dealt

primarily

with

the

contexts

of

police response to domestic violence related calls and suspicion
of

cocaine

differences

use. White.
among

856

types of

P. 2d at

664.

White

acknowledged

suspected

crime

in relation

to an

"automatic frisk":
The
concurrence
in Terry
first
noted
that
experience generally showed that the suspicion of
certain types of criminal activity
suggested
an
increased likelihood that the suspect might be armed
and dangerous.
According to Justice Harlan, where
u
there is an articulable suspicion of a crime of
violence," and an officer makes a justified stop, the
potential that the suspect is dangerous is so great
that "the right to frisk must be immediate and
automatic."
White.

856

P. 2d

at

663

(footnotes

omitted) .

The

type

of

suspected criminal activity here further distinguishes this case
from the result in White:
Utah courts have also noted the significance of
nature of suspected crime on the right to conduct
immediate frisk of a suspect. See State v. Carter.
P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1985); State v. Stricklina.
P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1992) .
Specifically
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the
an
707
844
the

Carter court authorized the automatic frisk of a
burglary suspect because the officer could reasonably
believe that a burglar might carry dangerous tools or
weapons in anticipation of strenuous objection from an
intended victim. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660.
White. 856 P.2d at 663 n.8

(emphasis added).

A screwdriver is

capable of being considered a dangerous tool or weapon in and of
itself.
White

also

shows

that

the

distinction

between

types

of

suspected criminal activity has been recognized in the leading
treatise:
Commentary has [since Terry] suggested that the
right to frisk should be automatic whenever "the
suspect has been stopped upon the suspicion that he has
committed, was committing or was about to commit a type
of crime for which the offender would likely be armed,
whether the weapon would be used to actually commit the
crime, to escape if the scheme went awry, or for
protection against the victim or others involved."
Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure. § 9.4(a) at 506
(2nd ed. 1987) .
White. 856 P. 2d at 665 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) .

The

trial

and

court's

only

reference

in

its

Findings

of

Fact

Conclusions of Law to the type of suspected criminal activity is
that the officer

"observed two males apparently attempting

enter a motor vehicle without use of a key." R.27.
court

did

not

consider

the

nature

activity in its analysis.
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of

the

suspected

to

The trial
criminal

E. The "Totality of the Circumstances" Support the Legality of
the Frisk
The trial court indicated that it relied primarily on State
v. White. R.29.
the

analysis

Although White is distinguishable in its facts,

it

provides

is

crucial.

circumstances determines reasonableness

u

[T]he

totality

of

in a Fourth Amendment

inquiry . . . ." White, 856 P.2d at 661.
The record here does not specify what type of specific
challenge the officer issued to the two people in the alley.
However, the trial court concluded in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that the officer appropriately
himself as a policeman. R.28.

identified

The trial court also concluded

that "before [the officer] made reasonable inquiries he engaged
in a Terry frisk of

[the defendant]." R.28.

The "reasonable

inquiry" mandates of the Terry frisk doctrine were reasonably
foregone under the circumstances, and indeed such inquiry is not
required under the White analysis.

"Since [Terry], the Supreme

Court has indicated an officer may forego this initial inquiry
when, because of specific circumstances, questioning would be
dangerous

to

the

(citation omitted).

police

officer."

White,

856

P.2d

at

662

Specific circumstances here indicated that

further questioning could be dangerous to the police officer.
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In White, the Court of Appeals agreed that "the officers,
anticipating

a volatile

situation, reasonably

took precautions

preparing for their encounter with defendant." White. 856 P.2d at
662.

In White, the primary officer

"requested

three back up

officers to accompany him when he responded to [the informant's]
call."

Two detectives confirmed certain facts when the officers

arrived.
drove

Two marked police cars and one unmarked police

up

behind

the

suspect

vehicle

in White.

The

car

suspect

vehicle was in a club parking lot. White, 856 P.2d at 657.
The
pattern.

present

situation

is

distinct

from

the

White

fact

Here a lone officer in a dark alley observes two men,

one with tools in hand, attempt to enter a vehicle without a key
in an area notorious for criminal activity and one with which the
officer is familiar on a personal basis.
is much closer to Terry than White.

The fact pattern here

See White. 856 P.2d at 660

n. 6.
In White the defendant claimed that:
his
cooperative
behavior
should
immediately
have
diffused any imminent sense of danger. Once that sense
of danger reasonably dissipated, he argues that minimal
inquiry would have dispelled any lingering suspicions
about the possibility of criminal activity or danger to
the investigating officers.
White.

856

P. 2d

at

662.

Cooperative
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behavior

is

one

consideration under the totality of the circumstances, but is not
determinative by itself.
White discussed a number of determinative criteria:

time of

the encounter [day versus night as opposed to length], number of
officers

and number of

suspects, prior

information

indicating

that defendant was armed, and the defendant's behavior. White.
856 P. 2d at 662-663.
examined

to

environment

determine
in

which

question defendant

The totality of the circumstances must be
whether
the

the

circumstances

responding

officers

create

could

"an

further

[before frisking him] without fear for their

safety." White. 856 P. 2d at 663.

The White analysis considers

other fact-specific information as well.
Multi-factor analysis of criminal activity and danger.
White

"Multi-factor Analysis

of Criminal Activity

and Danger"

mandates that the totality of the circumstances controls:
Individually, none of the evaluative criteria
described above are determinative of an officer's
prospective decision on the necessity of a frisk, and
no
one
factor
controls
a
reviewing
court's
retrospective
evaluation of whether a frisk was
justified at its inception. Instead, the police action
must be a reasonable invasion of an individual's
personal security in light of all circumstances of the
particular encounter.
White. 856 P.2d at 665(emphasis added).
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The

The White decision identified "three Utah cases which have
applied multi-factor analysis to justify frisks." White, 856 P.2d
at 665 n.13.
but

falls

This case is generally distinguishable from those,

closest

1985)("allowing

to

State

v.

Carter,

707

P. 2d

solo officer

to

frisk burglary

656

suspect

(Utah
with

suspicious bulge in pocket when officer confronted suspect in
dark alley near burglary scene"). White, 856 P.2d at 665 n.13.
In the cases listed by the White decision a bulge in a pocket or
some other suggestion that there was a concealed weapon was
present.

The record here does not present a suspicious bulge in

a pocket or coat visible from a distance.
At night, in a poorly lit alley, the ability to discern such
a bulge is diminished.

The "suspicious bulge" criteria is better

suited to daylight or well-lit area searches.

Here the record

presents

in the act of

a potential

suspect possibly

caught

burglarizing a car at night in an alley with poor lighting.
Further, the potential

suspect has a tool in hand that can

constitute a dangerous weapon.

That suggested to the officer

based on his experience that the individual before him might be
carrying other potential weapons.
"suspicious

bulge"

be

present

undertaken.
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White does not require that a
at

night

before

a

frisk

is

In

White,

"the

allegations

of

criminal

activity

were

provided by unverified third party hearsay." White. 856 P.2d at
666.

Here the suspected criminal activity was observed

hand.

The officer's

concern

for potential

violence

first

in White

arose from alleged domestic violence that had occurred some time
prior to the officer-citizen encounter.
The White officer(s) "approached defendant under relatively
safe conditions, during midday,

in a parking

lot, and

in the

company of three other officers." White. 856 P. 2d at 666.

Here

one officer approached two persons under potentially hazardous
conditions,

at night,

criminal activity.

in a dark

alley with

"On-scene observations

a reputation

for

[in White! . . . did

not indicate present or intended criminal activity." White. 856
P.2d at 666.
suggested

Direct on-scene observations by the officer here

immediate

circumstances,

where

criminal
at

least

activity.
one

of

the

Under
two

all

persons

the
had

a

potential weapon in hand, the officer is not required to make
inquiries before moving to frisk the suspects.

Especially where

the officer is alone and outnumbered, to engage in that type of
inquiry places him at unnecessary risk.
The trial court stated its concern thus:
Although Officer Wooldridge testified that he had
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some concern because he did not know the other
individual in the alley, the officer frisked Mr.
Medina, the person known to him first; therefore the
Court finds that Officer Wooldridge did not objectively
evidence any heightened concern about the unknown
person."
R.28.

Why is it significant to the trial court that the officer

was not specific in his concerns about the unknown person?
the

circumstances,

the

fact

that

the

unknown

Under

person

was

accompanying the person attempting to gain entry into the car is
simply one more circumstance that increases the officer's concern
for his safety.
That the officer searched the defendant first, even though
he was known to the officer, is only appropriate.

The trial

court's notation

individual

first

suggests

somehow demonstrates

that

searching

the known

a lack of concern about

gentleman, and somehow provides support

the

for the trial

other

court's

theory that the reasonable concern dissipated before the frisk.
The City disputes such an interpretation.

The known individual

was also the only one with a potential weapon in hand.
suggests

that he may be more

weapons) on his person.
The

likely to have other tools

That
(or

That in fact turned out to be the case.

"other gentleman" was frisked and sent on his way.

The

known individual was searched and in fact a potential dangerous
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weapon was found on his person.
In addition, why is the amount of detail regarding the
"other

gentleman"

determinative

of

the

frisk

of

the

person

actually trying to get into the car with the dangerous tool in
hand?

The officer had to choose someone to frisk first, if in

fact he was going to frisk anyone.

It is certainly reasonable to

frisk the person actually trying to get into the car first.

It

would appear that just by the fact he is more active of the two
persons that he is a greater potential threat.
The City would submit that contrary to the trial court's
determination, the officer here did in fact objectify his concern
regarding "the other gentleman".

As previously indicated the

officer checked the defendant for weapons "[because] it's a dark
alley, there's frequent physical assaults in that area.

I'm

alone, I have two people with me . . . [the defendant and the]
other gentleman that I didn't know and I didn't know [the other
gentleman's] history . . . ." R.66.

The officer stated that "I

believe that any other action than to check these people for
weapons would detriment [sic] to physical safety." R.67.

Simply

put, "the other gentleman" was an additional unknown element in a
situation already full of unknowns.
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P. The Trial Court's Conclusion of Reasonableness Was "Induced by
an Erroneous View of the Law",
Regarding
court

the

states that
xw

generally found

'"reasonableness"
it is a balancing

determination,
test:

the

White

"The Terry

Court

no ready test for determining

reasonableness

other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.'" White. 856 P.2d at 665.
appeared

to suggest

The defense

that the officer was or should have been

obligated to wait for backup, and/or make initial inquiries and
then verify the response prior to the frisk.
while

waiting

for

back

Holding a citizen

up

invasion/imposition/intrusion/burden

constitutes

itself,

one

that

an
both

inconveniences an innocent citizen and that places an officer at
risk if the citizen is inclined to harm the officer in order to
escape before back-up arrives.
VIII. Conclusion
The

trial

uncontroverted
trial

court

to

evaluate

the

facts, or facts as the court

court's

incorrect.

failed

The

conclusions
trial

of

court's

erroneous view of the law.

law

based

significance
found them.

on

conclusions were

the

The

facts

are

induced by

State v. White. 856 P. 2d 656

of

an

(Utah

1993) , and related case law, does not authorize the trial court
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to grant a motion to suppress under the facts presented by this
case.
The concern for officer safety was expressly acknowledged in
White:

"Utah

courts

recognize

officers'

need

to

protect

themselves and others when they 'knowingly and willingly enter
hostile environs to confront dangerous persons.' State v. Roybal.
716 P.2d 291, 293

(Utah 1986)." White, 856 P.2d at 665.

The

facts here clearly qualify this as just such a "hostile environ".
It is easy forget what reasonable fear is.

For those of us

whose contact with citizens is filtered past security personnel
and metal detectors during the day the definition of reasonable
fear may be one thing.

For someone alone at night in a dark

alley outnumbered by persons whose intent is unknown, reasonable
fear may have a different definition. As a matter of social
policy, the appropriate mandates of frisk law do not prevent a
police

officer

from

doing

a

weapons/safety

frisk

before

conducting a preliminary inquiry under these facts.
The trial court either misinterpreted

or misapplied

the

dictates of State v. White. Terry v. Ohio, and associated case
law.

Therefore the trial court's conclusions of law and order

suppressing evidence based on such facts are incorrect.

32

On that basis, the City would request that the Court's order
suppressing

the frisk

evidence

be overruled

and the matter

remanded to the District Court for trial.
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SCOTT A. FISHER (^By46728)
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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